# 1NC

### 1NC Vampirism K

#### the affirmative is a nihilistic vision of cyberspace: accidents, cyberwar, and totalitarianism. their response is to advocate a radical embrace of uncertainty – to look towards an ateleological future and accept its ambiguity. the negative presents you with exactly the opposite vision, a profoundly different orientation towards time, futurity, and technology. our advocacy is to imagine a teleological future that ends in a cyber-utopia, a world in which there are no accidents and cyber-technology creates advances that lead to a world free of all forms of inequality and violence. we believe that a telos, even if false, can provide us a helpful heuristic for our political conduct in the world.

#### here is a description of the cyber-utopia.

Ludlow 1 – prof of philosophy @ Northwestern

(Peter, introduction to Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias, MIT Press)

Are genuine utopias also in the works? Well, we’ve heard a lot about possible utopias since Thomas More (indeed, since Plato’s Republic), but so far we haven’t seen anything remotely utopian in the real world. But perhaps that is because we are looking for a grand, even global, utopia. Genuine utopias are more likely to be small, community-based, and fleeting. And perhaps the Internet provides the opportunity for utopias to emerge in various remote corners of cyberspace—in various “islands in the Net,” to borrow a phrase from Bruce Sterling.¶ These are just some of the general themes that I wanted to touch on, but there are also possible themes that are conspicuously absent here. For example, I have studiously avoided important issues of cyberspace law such as government censorship of the Net, the right to Internet access, and so on. These are important issues, but they are issues about the relation between current governance structures and the Net. Here I am more concerned about the emergence of new governance structures within the Net than with efforts to establish legal sovereignty over the Net. To me, these are the conceptually interesting issues, and if they seem relatively unimportant or otherworldly now, in the fullness of time I think they will become central to our understanding of the complex worlds that we inhabit.¶ While some cyberspace collections tend to be unstructured, it seems to me that this material suggests a certain linear logic of exposition. In section I, we take up the issue of the sovereignty of the Internet, beginning with John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the Independence of cyberspace.” This essay offers the provocative claim that the traditional nation states have no legitimate authority over cyberspace. Not surprisingly, Barlow’s piece has generated a fair bit of criticism, most of it concluding that Barlow is offering a kind of escape from reality. Others have held that this criticism may be hasty.¶ Whatever the merits of political independence for cyberspace, it would be a mistake to conclude that it is unfeasible on technological grounds. In section 2 we take up the question of how widespread access to re- sources like Pretty Good Privacy and anonymous remailers allow the possibility of crypto anarchy—in effect, carving out space for activities that lie outside of the purview of nation states and other traditional powers.¶ As we will see, crypto anarchy may not be necessary to carve out spaces that are autonomous from the nation states: to a large degree this is already taking place without the help of encryption technologies. The readings in section 3 show that the growth of commerce on the Internet is generating questions of legal jurisdiction and taxation for which the geographic boundaries of nation states seem obsolete. It appears ever more likely that independent online legal jurisdictions will be established and that they will remain largely independent of standard terrestrial legal authorities. If politically autonomous islands in the Net do become possible, then what sort of governance structures will arise? As we see in section 4, there is plenty of room for experimentation. Indeed, experimentation is already under way. A number of online communities, including MUDs and MOOs, have evolved from experiments that move from lawlessness to democracies, from virtual aristocracies to democracies, and in at least one case, from aristocracy to democracy and back to a form of limited aristocracy. There have been experiments with virtual lawmaking, with virtual magistrates, and with forms of virtual punishment. What can we learn from these experiments? What can they tell us about the future governance structures of the islands in the Net? Will they give rise to just and equitable governance institutions that respect individual moral autonomy? Or will they go the way of real-world (RW) governments?¶ Many have argued that the emerging governance structures need not go the way of the RW governments. Indeed, some writers have advanced a utopian vision of the sort of future that will be ushered in by these islands in the Net. Others argue that this is sheer turn-of-the-millennium escapism. But again, perhaps that criticism is driven by a misunderstanding of the kinds of utopias expected—not grand permanent governance structures but rather fleeting, isolated “pirate utopias.”¶ Who’s right about the outcome of all this? In a certain sense it doesn’t matter. If the birth of the Internet and the emergence of crypto anarchy at the dawn of a new millennium in the West bring us utopian visions, perhaps that is all for the best, even if those visions never come to fruition. It is so rare that we sit back and reflect in a deep way on our existing political structures. If it takes a new technology and a new millennium to get us to reflect, then let us be thankful that a new millennium and a new technology are upon us. For surely, in the grand scheme of things, the political options currently available to us in the real world are negligible. Nowhere is this more true than in the United States, where the differences between the Republican and Democrat Parties are played up as being monumental, and shifts in power are characterized as revolutions, but in reality the differences are vanishingly small. Perhaps that becomes clear only if we gaze on the political landscape of the last ten centuries rather than the last ten days. Perhaps it takes utopian visions—in this case, visions grounded in the emerging information technologies of our age—to give us the inspiration to reflect on how things could be, and, more important, how they should be.

#### we are trapped in an ideological system that closes off all possibilities of theorizing radical emancipation – our utopian performative is a method that opens up a mental free play that reveals to us the failure of our current ideology – this is the only method to catalyze radical, positive change

Jameson 4 – prof @ Duke University

(Fredric, The Politics of Utopia, New Left Review)

Mental play

How should we then formulate the position of utopia with respect to the political? I would like to suggest the following: that utopia emerges at the moment of the suspension of the political; I am almost tempted to say of its excision, or better still, borrowing Lacanian jargon to convey its strange externality from the social field, its extimacy; or even, to borrow the figure that Derrida derives from the Abraham-Torok analysis of Freud’s Wolf-Man, its ‘encryptment’. [10] But are figures really the right way of conveying this peculiar autonomy of the political, sealed and forgotten like a cyst within the social as such? Perhaps it will be easier to start by saying: politics is always with us, and it is always historical, always in the process of changing, of evolving, of disintegrating and deteriorating. I want to convey a situation in which political institutions seem both unchangeable and infinitely modifiable: no agency has appeared on the horizon that offers the slightest chance or hope of modifying the status quo, and yet in the mind—and perhaps for that very reason—all kinds of institutional variations and re-combinations seem thinkable.¶ What I am calling political institutions are thus the object and the raw material of a ceaseless mental play, like those home-mechanics construction sets I spoke of; and yet there is not the slightest prospect of reform, let alone revolution, in real life. And when I suggested that this reality paralysis might, in fact, be the precondition of the new, purely intellectual and constructivist freedom, the paradox might be explained this way: that as one approaches periods of genuine pre-revolutionary ferment, when the system really seems in the process of losing its legitimacy, when the ruling elite is palpably uncertain of itself and full of divisions and self-doubts, when popular demands grow louder and more confident, then what also happens is that those grievances and demands grow more precise in their insistence and urgency. We focus more sharply on very specific wrongs, the dysfunctioning of the system becomes far more tangibly visible at crucial points. But at such a moment the utopian imagination no longer has free play: political thinking and intelligence are trained on very sharply focused issues, they have concrete content, the situation claims us in all its historical uniqueness as a configuration; and the wide-ranging drifts and digressions of political speculation give way to practical programmes (even if the latter are hopelessly unrealizable and ‘utopian’ in the other, dismissive sense). [11]¶ Is this to say any more than that, when it comes to politics, utopianism is utterly impractical in the first place? But we can also frame the conditions of possibility for such impractical speculation in a positive way. After all, most of human history has unfolded in situations of general impotence and powerlessness, when this or that system of state power is firmly in place, and no revolts seem even conceivable, let alone possible or imminent. Those stretches of human history are for the most part passed in utterly non-utopian conditions, in which none of the images of the future or of radical difference peculiar to utopias ever reach the surface.¶ Periodizing imagination¶ We need, then, to posit a peculiar suspension of the political in order to describe the utopian moment: it is this suspension, this separation of the political—in all its unchangeable immobility—from daily life and even from the world of the lived and the existential, this externality that serves as the calm before the storm, the stillness at the centre of the hurricane; and that allows us to take hitherto unimaginable mental liberties with structures whose actual modification or abolition scarcely seem on the cards. I am trying to characterize the situation of Thomas More, on the eve of capitalism (in Louis Marin’s account), or on that of the absolute monarchies and the emergence of the new nation states (in Phillip Wegner’s); [12] to characterize the eighteenth century itself, and Rousseau’s endless fantasies about new constitutions—fantasies that seem to have absorbed him as completely as the romantic and libidinal ones we also associate with his name, but which emerge in a situation in which the great revolution, only a few years away, is still utterly unimaginable. I am thinking, too, of the great utopian production of the populist and progressive era in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century; and finally of the utopianism of the 1960s. These are all periods of great social ferment but seemingly rudderless, without any agency or direction: reality seems malleable, but not the system; and it is that very distance of the unchangeable system from the turbulent restlessness of the real world that seems to open up a moment of ideational and utopian-creative free play in the mind itself or in the political imagination. If this conveys any kind of plausible picture of the historical situation in which utopias are possible, then it remains only to wonder whether it does not also correspond to that of our own time.¶ So utopianism involves a certain distance from the political institutions which encourages an endless play of fantasy around their possible reconstructions and restructurations. But what is the content of those fantasies? As in Freud’s analysis of dreams, there is the satisfaction of secondary elaboration or interminable overdetermination; but there is also the implacable pressure of the unconscious wish or desire. Can we neglect that wish, without missing everything that gives utopia its vitality and its libidinal and existential claims on us? Probably not; and I therefore hope to offer a very simple answer to this question, one that does not use the words ‘more perfect’ or ‘the general good’, happiness, satisfaction, fulfilment, or any of those other conventional slogans.¶ First, though, it is necessary to explain a second complicated position, one that has perplexed both my readers and those of Louis Marin’s great book on the subject which inspired many of my own thoughts. It is that utopia is somehow negative; and that it is most authentic when we cannot imagine it. Its function lies not in helping us to imagine a better future but rather in demonstrating our utter incapacity to imagine such a future—our imprisonment in a non-utopian present without historicity or futurity—so as to reveal the ideological closure of the system in which we are somehow trapped and confined. This is, to be sure, a peculiarly defeatist position for any self-respecting and full-blooded utopian to take, let alone defend, and one is tempted to evoke nihilism or neurosis; it is certainly rather un-American in spirit. Yet I think I can defend its essential reasonableness by dealing with it under two heads: ideology and fear.¶ Standpoint of dreams¶ The point about ideology is not a particularly complicated one: it sets out from the conviction that we are all ideologically situated, we are all shackled to an ideological subject-position, we are all determined by class and class history, even when we try to resist or escape it. And for those unfamiliar with this ideological perspectivism or class standpoint theory, it is perhaps necessary to add that it holds for everyone, left or right, progressive or reactionary, worker as well as boss, and underclasses, marginals, ethnic or gender victims, fully as much as for the ethnic, race or gender mainstreams.¶ This situation has an interesting consequence in the present context: it means, not only that all utopias spring from a specific class position, but that their fundamental thematization—the root-of-all-evil diagnosis in terms of which they are each framed—will also reflect a specific class-historical standpoint or perspective. The utopian, to be sure, imagines his effort as one of rising above all immediate determinations in some all-embracing resolution of every imaginable evil and misery of our own fallen society and reality. Such was, for example, the immense utopian imagination of Charles Fourier, the Hegel of socio-political speculation and a figure whose fantasy-energy sought to encompass all possible characterological variants in his extraordinary system. But Fourier was a petty bourgeois; and even the farthest épicycle de Mercure, even the most capacious Absolute Spirit, remains an ideological one. No matter how comprehensive and trans-class or post-ideological the inventory of reality’s flaws and defects, the imagined resolution necessarily remains wedded to this or that ideological perspective.¶ This explains much about the various debates and differences that have peopled the history of utopian thought. Most often they come in pairs or opposites, and I would like to recapitulate a few of them—beginning, perhaps, with some of the examples already touched on: my own fantasy about universal employment, for instance. For an equally strong utopian case can be made for the elimination of labour altogether, for a ‘jobless future’ in which the absence of labour is joyously utopian: did not Marx’s own son-in-law write a book called The Right to Be Lazy? And was not one of the central ideas of the 1960s (Marcuse’s) the prospect of a wonder-working technology that would eliminate alienated labour worldwide? [13] We can see the same opposition at work in the very deployment of the terms ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ in the utopian context: for have we not demonstrated that some utopians long for the end of the political altogether, while others revel in the prospect of an eternity of political wrangling, of argufying promoted to the very essence of a collective social life?

#### this utopian imaginative provides a critical diagnostic tool that reveals to us the structural contingencies of human nature that have produced mass inequality, racism, sexism, and other evils – it is the only heuristic that equips us with the tools to combat such evils

Jameson 4 – prof @ Duke University

(Fredric, The Politics of Utopia, New Left Review)

Let us begin again, then, with the textual utopias themselves. Here we encounter two alternate possibilities of analysis, which can be designated respectively as the causal and the institutional, or perhaps even the diachronic and the synchronic. The first of these has to do with the utopian world as such; or better and more precisely, with the way in which this or that ‘root of all evil’ has been eliminated from that world. In Thomas More, for example, what every reader famously takes away—as from Plato, too—is the abolition of private property. This allegedly makes both More and Plato precursors of communism. But a closer look, and an inquiry into the theory of human nature that underpins both these assaults on the institution of private property, discloses a rather different position: that the root of all evil is to be found in gold or money, and that it is greed (as a psychological evil) which needs to be somehow repressed by properly utopian laws and arrangements in order to arrive at some better and more humane form of life. The question of hierarchy and egalitarianism is, on this interpretation, primed in More by the more fundamental question of money. This kind of utopianism has had a long and illustrious descendency, to Proudhon and Henry George and on down to Major Douglas and the famous stamp-script dear to Ezra Pound; but such names already suggest that it may not be altogether correct to read the denunciation of money as the direct ancestor of communism.¶ More was concerned to eliminate individual property relations; Marx’s critique of property was designed to eliminate the legal and individual possession of the collective means of production; and the elimination of that kind of private property was meant to lead to a situation in which classes as such disappeared, and not merely social hierarchies and individual injustices. I would want to go further than this and assert that what is crucial in Marx is that his perspective does not include a concept of human nature; it is not essentialist or psychological; it does not posit fundamental drives, passions or sins like acquisitiveness, the lust for power, greed or pride. Marx’s is a structural diagnosis, and is perfectly consistent with contemporary existential, constructivist or anti-foundationalist and postmodern convictions which rule out presuppositions as to some pre-existing human nature or essence. If there have been not just one human nature but a whole series of them, this is because so-called human nature is historical: every society constructs its own. And, to paraphrase Brecht, since human nature is historical rather than natural, produced by human beings rather than innately inscribed in the genes or DNA, it follows that human beings can change it; that it is not a doom or destiny but rather the result of human praxis.¶ Marx’s anti-humanism, then (to use another term for this position), or his structuralism, or even his constructivism, spells a great advance over More. But once we grasp utopianism in this way, we see that there are a variety of different ways to reinvent utopia—at least in this first sense of the elimination of this or that ‘root of all evil’, taken now as a structural rather than a psychological matter. These various possibilities can also be measured in practical-political ways. For example, if I ask myself what would today be the most radical demand to make on our own system—that demand which could not be fulfilled or satisfied without transforming the system beyond recognition, and which would at once usher in a society structurally distinct from this one in every conceivable way, from the psychological to the sociological, from the cultural to the political—it would be the demand for full employment, universal full employment around the globe. As the economic apologists for the system today have tirelessly instructed us, capitalism cannot flourish under full employment; it requires a reserve army of the unemployed in order to function and to avoid inflation. That first monkey-wrench of full employment would then be compounded by the universality of the requirement, inasmuch as capitalism also requires a frontier, and perpetual expansion, in order to sustain its inner dynamic. But at this point the utopianism of the demand becomes circular, for it is also clear, not only that the establishment of full employment would transform the system, but also that the system would have to be already transformed, in advance, in order for full employment to be established. I would not call this a vicious circle, exactly; but it certainly reveals the space of the utopian leap, the gap between our empirical present and the utopian arrangements of this imaginary future.¶ Yet such a future, imaginary or not, also returns upon our present to play a diagnostic and a critical-substantive role. To foreground full employment in this way, as the fundamental utopian requirement, allows us, indeed, to return to concrete circumstances and situations, to read their dark spots and pathological dimensions as so many symptoms and effects of this particular root of all evil identified as unemployment. Crime, war, degraded mass culture, drugs, violence, boredom, the lust for power, the lust for distraction, the lust for nirvana, sexism, racism—all can be diagnosed as so many results of a society unable to accommodate the productiveness of all its citizens. At this point, then, utopian circularity becomes both a political vision and programme, and a critical and diagnostic instrument.

### 1NC Museums K

#### A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg –

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.

Algoso 2011 – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011

(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

### 1NC Case

No impact to speed.

Thrift 5 — Nigel Thrift, Head of the Division of Life and Environmental Sciences and Professor of Geography at the University of Oxford, 2005 (“Panicsville: Paul Virilio and the Esthetic of Disaster,” Cultural Politics, Volume 1, Issue 3, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SocINDEX, p. 357)

Than take speed. I have shown in numerous papers, as have many commentators now, that any serious historical analysis of the impact of increasing speed on society demonstrates that its impact ismuch more variegated than Virilio credits, and does not add up to any particular tendency (such as that sad old chestnut, the "time-space compression" story). I, like many other commentators, have demonstrated this over and over again, pretty well to distraction - and largely to no avail it has to be said. The idea that increasing speed somehow has causality is an urban myth so deeply engrained in Western individuals' idea of themselves and how they are that it is probably not dislodgeable—but that doesn't mean that philosophers have to power it up.

Fast is good – it creates an inclusive community for more democratic deliberation

Kellner, 2003 – critical theorist in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the GSEI at UCLA (Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, illuminations: the critical theory project, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm>)

But while there are still threats to world peace and even human survival from the dark forces of military capitalism, one of the surprising events of the past decade is the emergence of a new form of Microsoft capitalism, of less lethal and more decentralized new technologies, of new modes of peaceful connection and communication. The project of this new form of technocapitalism is the development of an information-entertainment society that we might call the infotainment society and which is sometimes described as the "information superhighway." This form of capitalism is a softer capitalism, a less violent and destructive one, a more ecological mode of social organization, based on more flexible, smaller-scale, and more ludic technologies.[6] The differences between hard military capitalism and a softer Microsoft capitalism are evident in the transformation of the computer from a top-down, highly centralized, specialized machine controlled by big organizations to the smaller scale, more flexible, and more ludic personal computer (see Turkle 1996 for elaboration of this distinction). Moreover, the surprising development of the Internet opens up new public spheres and the possibility of political intervention by groups and individuals excluded from political dialogue during the era of Big Media, controlled by the state and giant corporations (for elaboration of this argument see Kellner 1995, 1996, and forthcoming). Of course, Microsoft capitalism has its own dangers ranging from economic worries about near-monopoly control of economic development through software domination to the dangers of individuals getting lost in the proliferating terrains of cyberspace and the attendant decline of individual autonomy and initiative, social relations and interaction, and community. Yet the infotainment society promises more connections, interactions, communication, and new forms of community. The project is in far too early stages to be able to appropriately evaluate so for now we should rest content to avoid the extremes of technophobia which would reject the new technologies out of hand as new forms of alienation or domination contrasted to technophilic celebrations of the information superhighway as the road to a computopia of information, entertainment, affluence, and democracy.

Alt fails – no method for being implemented into society and it condemns technology

Kellner, 2003 – critical theorist in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the GSEI at UCLA (Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, illuminations: the critical theory project, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm>)

Virilio misses a key component of the drama of technology in the present age and that is the titanic struggle between national and international governments and corporations to control the structure, flows, and content of the new technologies in contrast to the struggle of individuals and social groups to use the new technologies for their own purposes and projects. This optic posits technology as a contested terrain, as a field of struggle between competing social groups and individuals trying to use the new technologies for their own projects. Despite his humanism, there is little agency or politics in Virilio's conceptual universe and he does not delineate the struggles between various social groups for the control of the new technologies and the new politics that they will produce. Simply by damning, demonizing and condemning new technologies, Virilio substitutes moralistic critique for social analysis and political action, reducing his analysis to a lament and jeremiad rather than an ethical and political critique la Ellul and his tradition of Catholic critique of contemporary civilization, or critical social theory. Virilio has no theory of justice, no politics to counter, reconstruct, reappropriate, or transform technology, no counterforces that can oppose technology. Thus, the increasing shrillness of his lament, the rising hysteria, and sense of futile impotence. While Virilio's take on technology is excessively negative and technophobic, his work is still of importance in understanding the great transformation currently underway. Clearly, speed and the instantaneity and simultaneity of information are more important to the new economy and military than ever before, so Virilio's reflections on speed, technology, politics, and culture are extremely relevant. Yet he seems so far to have inadequately conceptualized the enormous changes wrought by an infotainment society and the advent of a new kind of multimedia information-entertainment technology. If my hunch is correct, his view of technology and speed is integrally structured by his intense focus on war and the , while his entire mode of thought is a form of military-technological determinism which forces him not only to overlook the important role of capital, but also the complex ambiguities, the mixture of positive and negative features, of the new technologies now proliferating and changing every aspect of society and culture in the present era.

#### Speeding Tech is good – only way to solve transhumanism

Bostrom 5[Nick, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, “Transhumanist Values,” Last Mod Sept 17, http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.html]

Wide access. It is not enough that the posthuman realm be explored by someone. The full realization of the core transhumanist value requires that, ideally, everybody should have the opportunity to become posthuman. It would be sub-optimal if the opportunity to become posthuman were restricted to a tiny elite. There are many reasons for supporting wide access: to reduce inequality; because it would be a fairer arrangement; to express solidarity and respect for fellow humans; to help gain support for the transhumanist project; to increase the chances that you will get the opportunity to become posthuman; to increase the chances that those you care about can become posthuman; because it might increase the range of the posthuman realm that gets explored; and to alleviate human suffering on as wide a scale as possible. The wide access requirement underlies the moral urgency of the transhumanist vision. Wide access does not argue for holding back. On the contrary, other things being equal, it is an argument for moving forwardas quickly as possible. 150,000 human beings on our planet die every day, without having had any access to the anticipated enhancement technologies that will make it possible to become posthuman. The sooner this technology develops, the fewer people will have died without access. Consider a hypothetical case in which there is a choice between (a) allowing the current human population to continue to exist, and (b) having it instantaneously and painlessly killed and replaced by six billion new human beings who are very similar but non-identical to the people that exist today. Such a replacement ought to be strongly resisted on moral grounds, for it would entail the involuntary death of six billion people. The fact that they would be replaced by six billion newly created similar people does not make the substitution acceptable. Human beings are not disposable. For analogous reasons, it is important that the opportunity be become posthuman is made available to as many humans as possible, rather than having the existing population merely supplemented (or worse, replaced) by a new set of posthuman people. The transhumanist ideal will be maximally realized only if the benefits of technologies are widely shared and if they are made available as soon as possible, preferably within our lifetime.

#### Transhumanism solves disease, aging, rape, and violence

Bostrom 9 PhD from the London School of Economics (Nick, 2/5/2009, “IN DEFENSE OF POSTHUMAN DIGNITY”, http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/hon182/Posthuman\_dignity\_Bostrom.pdf)

The prospect of posthumanity is feared for at least two reasons. One is that the state of being posthuman might in itself be degrading, so that by becoming posthuman we might be harming ourselves. Another is that posthumans might pose a threat to ‘ordinary’ humans. (I shall set aside a third possible reason, that the development of posthumans might offend some supernatural being.) The most prominent bioethicist to focus on the first fear is Leon Kass: Most of the given bestowals of nature have their given speciesspecified natures: they are each and all of a given sort . Cockroaches and humans are equally bestowed but differently natured. To turn a man into a cockroach – as we don’t need Kafka to show us – would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a man might be so as well. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift that is our own given nature 3 Transhumanists counter that nature’s gifts are sometimes poisoned and should not always be accepted. Cancer, malaria, dementia, aging, starvation, unnecessary suffering, and cognitive shortcomings are all among the presents that we would wisely refuse. Our own species-specified natures are a rich source of much of the thoroughly unrespectable and unacceptable – susceptibility for disease, murder, rape, genocide, cheating, torture, racism. The horrors of nature in general, and of our own nature in particular, are so well documented 4 that it is astonishing that somebody as distinguished as Leon Kass should still in this day and age be tempted to rely on the natural as a guide as to what is desirable or normatively right. We should be grateful that our ancestors were not swept away by the Kassian sentiment, or we would still be picking lice off each other’s backs. Rather than deferring to the natural order, transhumanists maintain that we can legitimately reform ourselves and our natures in accordance with humane values and personal aspirations.

#### Technocracy helps solve accidents

Kellner, 2003 – critical theorist in the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education in the GSEI at UCLA (Douglas, “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, illuminations: the critical theory project, <http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell29.htm>)

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, we are, as I argue below, in a new historical era which Virilio has so far not adequately theorized. He remains, in my view, trapped in a mode of technological determinism and a perspective on technology that equates technology with military technology and pure war. For Virilio, technology drives us, it impels us into new modes of speed and motion, it carries us along predetermined trajectories. He believes that: the question, "Can we do without technology?" cannot be asked as such. We are forced to expand the question of technology not only to the substance produced, but also to the accident produced. The riddle of technology we were talking about before is also the riddle of the accident" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 31-32). Virilio claims that every technology involves its accompanying accident: with the invention of the ship, you get the ship wreck; the plane brings on plane crashes; the automobile, car accidents, and so on. For Virilio, the technocratic vision is thus one-sided and flawed in that it postulates a perfect technological system, a seamless cybernetic realm of instrumentality and control in which all processes are determined by and follow technological laws (Baudrillard also, to some extent, reproduces this cybernetic and technological imaginary in his writings; see Kellner 1989b). In the real world, however, accidents are part and parcel of technological systems, they expose its limitations, they subvert idealistic visions of technology. Accidents are consequently, in Virilio's view, an integral part of all modes of transportation, industrial production, war and military organization, and other technological systems. He suggests that in science a Hall of Accidents should be put next to each Hall of Machines: "Every technology, every science should choose its specific accident, and reveal it as a product--not in a moralistic, protectionist way (safety first), but rather as a product to be 'epistemo-technically' questioned. At the end of the nineteenth century, museums exhibited machines: at the end of the twentieth century, I think we must grant the formative dimensions of the accident its rightful place in a new museum" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983).[5] Virilio is fascinated as well by interruptions ranging from sleep to day dreams to maladies like picnolepsy or epilepsy to death itself (1991a and Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 33ff). Interruption is also a properly cinematic vision in which time and space are artificially parcelled and is close to the microscopic and fragmented vision that Lyotard identifies with "the postmodern condition" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 35). For Virilio, the cinema shows us that "consciousness is an effect of montage" (Virilio and Lotringer 1983: 35), that perception itself organizes experience into discontinuous fragments, that we are aware of objects and events in a highly discontinuous and fragmented mode.

#### Speed enables deliberation

Connolly 2000“Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism” Author(s): William E. Connolly. (Eisenhower Professor, Johns Hopkins University Political Theory, International Relations B.A., University of Michigan, Flint Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Recent Courses and Research Interests: Capitalism and Christianity Perception, The Media, Politics Nietzsche and His Interlocutors) Reviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 28, No. 5 (Oct., 2000), pp. 596-618Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192290 .

But what if the compression of distance through speed has effects Virilio records while some of those effects also improve the prospects for democratic pluralizationw within the state and a cosmopolitanism across states that speaks affirmatively to issues of ecology, peace, indigenous minorities, the legitinmation of new identities and rights, and the protection of old rights? Then acceleration would carry positive possibilities as well as dangers. And a single-minded attack on its dangers would forfeit access to its positive possibilities. Thus, to summarize for now a few contentions: First, the contemporary accentuation of tempo in interterritorial communications, entertainment, tourism, trade, and population migration exposes numerous settled constituencies to the historical basis of what they are and the comparative contestability of faiths and identities they have taken to be universal or incontestable. Second, the acceleration of accident and surprise, listed by Virilio as effects of speed, can also function over time to disrupt closed models of nature, truth, and morality into which people so readily become encapsulated, doing so in ways that support new paradigms of natural science and careful reconsideration of the injuries to difference supported by dogmatic conceptions. Third, Virilio's identification of the territorial nation as repository of democratic unity and of slowness as the temporal condition of national deliberation depreciates the value of a more expansive practice of pluralism that speaks generously to the multidimensional diversity of life already operative o n most territories today. Speed can be dangerous. At a certain point of acceleration, it jeopardizes freedom and shortens the time in which to engage ecological issues. But the crawl of slow time contains injuries, dangers, and repressive tendencies too. It may be wise therefore to explore speed as an ambiguous medium that contains some positive possibilities. The positive possibilities are lost to those who experience its effects only through nostalgia for a pristine time governed by the compass of the centered nation, the security of stable truth, the idea of nature as a purposive organism or a set of timeless laws, and the stolidity of thick universals. Today, ironically, the most virulent attempts to slow things down take the form of national and religious fundamentalisms that deploy media sound bites and military campaigns of ethnic cleansing to reinstate a slow, centered world. Indeed, the ambiguity of speed finds its most salient manifestation in the paradoxical contest taking place before our eyes between the pluralization and the fundamentalizationo f public cultures.T he politics to pluralize culture along several dimensions and the politics to fundamentalize hegemonic identities form two contending responses to late-modem speed. Each propensity intensifies under the same temporal conditions. As this contest proceeds, it also becomes clear why democratic pluralists must embrace the positive potentialities of speed while working to attenuate its most dangerous effects

# 1NR

### 2NC Overview

#### the only thing we have contested about the affirmative is their argument about how we should relate to the future, we can agree with everything else they’ve said – slowing down deliberative spaces like this debate is good, totalitarianism and liberalism are bad – SURE

#### you can view our advocacy as a pic out of a radical embrace of an ateleological future that the affirmative has advocated – that part of the aff is irrelevant to everything else they’ve said – they have proven expertly in this debate why the liberal telos is bad, proven that it leads to a desire for control that leads to atrocities, etc. – they have not proven why TELOS is bad – repeat for emphasis: they have not proven why TELOS as a conceptual frame for organizing our relationship to futurity is bad, they have only proven why ONE PARTICULAR telos is problematic – they then throw up their hands and embrace a radically uncertain, ateleological future – this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater – if we win there are productive applications of telos in the form of utopian performatives, we win the debate – they must prove that thinking of a historical endpoint is bad, not merely that the liberal telos is bad

#### now, utopias are a helpful heuristic when it comes to orienting ourselves towards the future, several advantages that the aff can’t capture

#### 1. first is mental free play – utopia allows us to lose sight of particular practical considerations and reorient all existing relationships and institutions in any way we please – this is a creative exercise that opens up radical political subjectivity – the affirmative cedes our agency by saying that the future could turn out in any which way, utopia gives us mental agency to create possible futures – that’s a productive exercise that builds critical thinking and political subjectivity

#### 2. second is ideology – when attempting to mentally construct the perfect society, we run into deep-seated barriers and obstacles to perfection that we find ourselves unable to work through – this is the power of utopia – we are not able to imagine how it could exist – it reveals to us that our mindset has been shaped by a fundamentally conservative ideology that seeks to prevent us from fundamentally rethinking social organization – the process of performing a utopia reveals to us the inadequacies of our own ideology – the affirmative does nothing to show the gaps of current ideology in resolving material inequalities

#### 3. third is the utopian gap – when imagining how a society would be different if we were to make utopian changes, we realize that the society would need to fundamentally change as a precondition for those utopian changes to even become possible – this is the utopian gap, the hole between the society we live in and the one we want to construct – back-tracing our steps gives us tools for constructing reforms and changes that enable and catalyze a more utopian world – our jameson evidence says that this can help resolve war, crime, sexism, racism, etc. by imagining a world without them and working in reverse – the affirmative, by being open to a radically uncertain future, is throwing their hands up in complete submission to potential futures that include material inequalities, racism, sexism, etc. – the negative’s commitment to utopia is a dogged commitment to a vision of a particular future that gives us a vision to work towards instead of remarking that the future is uncertain – only our orientation towards the future motivates and helps in working towards equality and justice

### 2NC AT Perm

#### **utopia is teleological – the affirmative’s embrace of radical uncertainty creates fear towards the future that corrupts the power of our strategy**

Sutherland 13 – prof of comm. @ U of Melbourne

(Thomas, Getting nowhere fast: A teleological conception of socio-technical acceleration, *Time & Society*)

We view this system in teleological terms because we no longer believe that we have the ability to control it. Beck (2009: 9) defines risk as ‘the anticipation of the catastrophe’ – is it any wonder that in an era that offers us little opportunity to slow down and really think about the decisions we make, that we would end up having little ability to anticipate anything but catastrophe? Perhaps the value of Zˇ izˇ ek’s (1994: 1) contention that ‘it seems easier to imagine the ‘‘end of the world’’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production’ comes not just from its neat encapsulation of the intractability of post-Cold War capitalism, but also in its representation of a society in which the future is thinkable only in terms of destruction. It is as if the utopian teleology of the Enlightenment has been reversed: today, we look to the future with fear and uncertainty, rather than hope.

#### Severance – hold the line – we set this up in CX – especially when debating K aff, you need to preserve link ground

#### They have said telos bad, we have proven a type of telos is good

### 2NC Performance

#### **obvi utopia is impossible, but the feelings and affective experiences that it stirs up can guide us towards a better world – this is only possible through a performance of utopia, which only the negative has done**

Dolan 1 – chair in Drama @ UT-Austin

(Jill, Performance, Utopia, and the Utopian Performative, Theatre Journal 53.3 455-479)

As scholars who study it demonstrate, most historical writings about utopia are futuristic tracts that describe social reorganizations or the redistribution of wealth and cultural roles. Especially the nineteenth century socialist utopians, like the Oneidas and the Shakers, like Charles Fourier, Samuel Butler, and Edward Bellamy, concerned themselves with imagining and trying to implement societies founded on their own, uniquely devised utopian principles. My goal here is not to propose a "real" utopia, if that's not an oxymoron. I'm not even sure I'd like to live in a utopia, a place without conflict or dissension, or that I'd like to see theatre that describes such a perfect place. Klaic notes, "Utopia is, by its very nature, without conflict--a state of stasis, harmony, and balance. These are not ingredients for exciting theatre, which is always based on conflict, opposition, and contradiction, or at least tension." Klaic says, "Theatre succeeds when it presents its utopian arguments as a blueprint, open to opposition, rather than depicting the consequences of their implementation." 16 Some scholars [End Page 459] wonder if there would even be theatre in a utopia. 17 We'll never know. But theatre can move us toward understanding the possibility of something better, can train our imaginations, inspire our dreams and fuel our desires in ways that might lead to incremental cultural change.¶ I'm not interested in constructing a utopia, although many of us who engage politically with non-profit organizations work to devise such systems, through our memberships on boards of directors and through the idealism of social service groups that want to do things differently. My concern here is with how utopia can be imagined or experienced affectively, through feelings, in small, incremental moments that performance can provide. As Richard Dyer says, in his chapter on entertainment and utopia, "Entertainment does not . . . present models of utopian worlds. . . . Rather the utopianism is contained in the feelings it embodies. It presents . . . what utopia would feel like rather than how it would be organized. It thus works at the level of sensibility, by which I mean an affective code that is characteristic of, and largely specific to, a given mode of cultural production." 18 These feelings and sensibilities, in performance, give rise to what I'm calling the "utopian performative." 19

#### **utopia can exist in fleeting moments in the here and now through performance of the utopian ideal – only the negative’s performance accesses the radical potential of utopian politics to address social ills – also we solve your arguments abt the formulation of political subjectivity**

Dolan 1 – chair in Drama @ UT-Austin

(Jill, Performance, Utopia, and the Utopian Performative, Theatre Journal 53.3 455-479)

In my new book Geographies of Learning: Theory and Practice, Activism and Performance, I argue for the ways in which theatre studies in the academy might be engaged as a site of progressive social and cultural practice. I urge students to be advocates for the arts, to be theatre-makers committed to creating performances of insight and compassion, and to become spectators who go to see performance because they want to learn something about their culture that extends beyond themselves and the present circumstances of our common humanity. 2 My argument is that theatre and performance create citizens and engage democracy as a participatory forum in which ideas and possibilities for social equity and justice are shared. I write quite a lot about how we might reimagine theatre studies programs to meet these goals. Yet it occurs to me that I didn't write much about theatre or performance itself in that book. This essay, then, takes the same beliefs, the same faith in theatre's transformative impact on how we imagine ourselves in culture, and looks more closely at performance. This project is also about citizenship and subjectivity; it imagines how a commitment to theatre and performance as transformational cultural practices might offer us consistent glimpses of utopia.¶ Dragan Klaic's book, The Plot of the Future: Utopia and Dystopia in Modern Drama, looks at modern dramatic literature that revives "interest in the future as a dramatic theme and as a chosen time setting of dramatic action." 3 But my contention is that performance--not just drama--is one of the few places where a live experience, as well as an expression, through content, of utopia might be possible. My concern here is more performative and more technical. I'm interested in the material conditions of theatre production and reception that evoke the sense that it's even possible to imagine a utopia, that boundless "no-place" where the social scourges that currently plague us--from poverty, famine, cancer, AIDS, inadequate health care, racial and gender discrimination, hatred of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered [End Page 456] people, the grossly unequal distribution of wealth and resources globally, religious intolerance, xenophobia expressed in anti-immigrant legislation, lack of access for the disabled, pay inequity, and of course a host of others--might be ameliorated, cured, redressed, solved, never to haunt us again. I have faith in the possibility that we can imagine such a place, even though I know that we can only imagine it, that we'll never achieve it in our lifetimes. But that knowledge doesn't prevent me from desiring a theatre in which an image of a better future can be articulated and even embodied, however fleetingly.¶ Utopia means, literally, "no-place" and was of course first coined in the sixteenth century by Thomas More. As political scientist Lyman Sargent says, "Utopian thought construed more widely . . . is not restricted to fiction and includes visionary . . . and apocalyptic as well as constitutional writings united by their willingness to envision a dramatically different form of society as either a social ideal-type or its negative inversion." 4 Scholars point out that while a vision of a radically different (and presumptively better) future drives experiments with utopia, something coercive lingers about the term. Utopias can be enforced at the expense of liberty, general consensus achieved by limiting choice. Fascism and utopia can skirt dangerously close to each other.¶ But idealism draws me here; as Roland Schaer says, "Utopia, one might say, is the measure of how far a society can retreat from itself when it wants to feign what it would like to become." 5 I find this notion very rich, the idea that in order to pretend, to enact an ideal future, a culture has to move farther and farther away from the real into a kind of performative, in which the utterance, in this case, doesn't necessarily make it so but inspires perhaps other more local "doings" that sketch out the potential in those feignings. As Sargent notes, in his extensive taxonomy of the genre of utopian literature, "Utopias are generally oppositional, reflecting, at the minimum, frustration with things as they are and the desire for a better life." 6 These definitions all point to the future, to imaginative territories that map themselves over the real. The utopia for which I yearn takes place now, in the interstices of present interactions, in glancing moments of possibly better ways to be together as human beings. Quoting Ruth Levitas, Rustom Bharucha says, "What is needed are not better 'maps of the future,' but more 'adequate maps of the present,' which can inspire the most effective means of activating the desire for a more humane world." 7

### 2NC Solves Case

#### **our advocacy has two parts: one that says utopia good and one that says that teleological understandings can be productive. a teleology of speed helps us understand social acceleration and cope with it better because it explains how speed has come to work in society.**

Sutherland 13 – prof of comm. @ U of Melbourne

(Thomas, Getting nowhere fast: A teleological conception of socio-technical acceleration, *Time & Society*)

‘More than a hundred years before it was fully manifest,’ observes Walter Benjamin (1999: 394), ‘the colossal acceleration of the tempo of living was heralded in the tempo of production. And, indeed, in the form of the machine’. Benjamin, who perceives in his study of the increasingly decrepit arcades of Paris a gradual compression of space and time that could only be understood as a symptom of the process of modernization, was one of the first to detect a phenomenon now widely recognized: that time appears to be accelerating. Just as importantly, he views this acceleration as a product of the increasingly mechanical technicity of the industrial era. In our present epoch, however, it is not so much industrial machinery as the digital pro- cessing and transmission of information that informs our temporal rhythms.¶ What I wish to argue in this paper is that in order to understand this acceleration, as well as posit alternatives to it, we must think it in teleological terms. That is, rather than viewing speed as a goal in itself, it must be viewed as a final cause that determines our understanding of such goals. Speed is not the end of a process, but is the ground upon which that process is predicated. What this means is that progress – being the aiming for spe- cific, calculated goals – can be divorced from the blind acceleration that we presently experience. In order to avoid naturalizing ‘the blurring of percep- tion caused by acceleration’ (Virilio, 2008: 116), it is imperative that we are able to argue that progress and acceleration are not synonymous, and I believe that this can best be achieved through a teleological understanding of this demand for speed.

#### **hold the line: where did the 2ac explain at all why an ateleological orientation towards the future is the only way, or even the best way, to cope with social acceleration? the first half of the 1ac and the second half are completely de-linked, there is zero connection between radical uncertainty and social acceleration**

#### the call for uncertainty is the messianism of speed because endpoints are rendered meaningless, speed becomes the inevitable here and now – turns case

Sutherland 13 – prof of comm. @ U of Melbourne

(Thomas, Getting nowhere fast: A teleological conception of socio-technical acceleration, *Time & Society*)

In this context, the indeterminate horizon that forms such a teleology can be seen as a kind of mythological regression: where the Stoics sought, in the face of a chaotic environment over which they felt no control, to put faith in the ultimate telos of providence, today our inability to perceive an end point leads to the eternally deferred eschatological messianism of speed. ‘Writing and archiving are concrete discursive practices and are fatal to truth’ (Kittler, 1990: 165): we have reached the margin of Enlightenment thought, the point at which its means have been so exteriorized through the archiving effects of media that the ends are not only forgotten, but are rendered meaningless.

### 2NC AT Stravakakis

#### Psychological study and fantasy can’t explain violence

Stanley Hoffman 86, Center for European Studies at Harvard,  “On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda,” *Political Psychology* 7.1 JSTOR

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that **it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray**: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of **[HU]**mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, is precisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy," because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say the least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality. **Enemies are not mere projections of negative identities; they are** often quite **real.** To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding, commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. Traditionalists fear that this particular approach leads to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhapsunusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous—necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied.